Strategic Interaction Between Islamist Terror Groups by Nina Ismael

Author:Nina Ismael
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9783030513078
Publisher: Springer International Publishing

4.2 Countermeasures

A lot of emphases has been put on the analysis of countermeasures, particularly on interactions between two at-risk governments. In general, countermeasures are intended to mitigate the threat of terrorism and avoid incidents. When an attack occurs, they will diminish the consequences of a particular terrorist attack.

As mentioned, countermeasures come in two ways, by offensive or defensive means. The latter increases the costs on the part of the terrorists and are intended to deter an attack. In addition, defensive countermeasures reduce the likelihood of a terrorist group’s success and, even if successful, may limit the resulting losses. Protective actions may involve metal detectors and other technological barriers at airports, securing borders, increasing surveillance, and hardening targets in general (Sandler and Siqueira 2006, p. 1371).

Defensive actions transfer the threat to softer targets. In the context of transnational terrorism, the terror threat may be deflected toward other countries, thereby imposing costs on others. Other countries, in turn, can do the same thing, which will increase costs. Furthermore, an actor, who engages in deterrence does not only have to spend resources to protect the homeland and being a less attractive target for potential terrorists but may also suffer costs from the negative external effect, when own properties or people become targeted abroad (Arce and Sandler 2005, p. 185).

In contrast, offensive measures target the terrorist group or its sponsor directly and include actions such as infiltration, preemptive or retaliatory strikes, or freezing assets, thereby making everyone safer, who may be at risk due to the weakened terrorist group. The offensive measure’s outcome is a public good, potentially involving a free-rider problem if offensive measures require coordination among several at-risk countries (Sandler and Arce 2003, p. 324).

If, for example, one country was to take the lead in pursuing unilateral offensive action, it would bear the full costs of a military strike, while others would benefit once the threat is removed without carrying any costs so that it has no incentive to share the costs associated with the military raid. One nation will only take action if its benefits exceed the costs, regardless of whether others benefit. If the benefits are assumed to be too small, i.e., smaller than the private costs of offensive action, then a unilateral strike by, for example, the United States will not happen.

To illustrate the different properties of defensive and offensive measures, consider the 3 × 3 game in Fig. 4.1 where two nations can either participate in offensive action, maintain the status quo, or deter a terrorist threat by defensive means. The bold printed 2 × 2 submatrices display a 2 × 2 offensive action game at the upper left corner and a 2 × 2 defensive action game on the bottom right, respectively.

Fig. 4.13 × 3 preemption–deterrence game. Source: Sandler and Arce (2007, p. 784). Notes: In its very basic form, 2B > c > B and C + f > b > C are assumed to hold

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